The status quo bias and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: impact of voting rules, the European Commission and external changes
We develop a formal model of EU decision-making on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The model is used to evaluate under what conditions CAP reform occurs and what the influence of the European Commission (Commission) is on CAP reform. We find that the voting and amendment rules in the Council of the European Union, the number of policy instruments and external changes have important impacts on the occurrence and extent of CAP reform and on the influence of the Commission. Stricter voting rules increase the status quo bias and reduce Commission influence, whereas stricter amendment rules increase both the status quo bias and Commission influence. More significant external change results in more reform and more Commission influence. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 33 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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