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On government credibility, compensation and under-investment in public research

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  • Johan F. M. Swinnen
  • Harry de Gorter

Abstract

Static political economy studies show that under-investment in public research may result because of income distributional effects--which induce opposition from groups adversely affected--and that compensation policies can mitigate opposition to public research. This paper explores the intertemporal aspects of this policy issue using a dynamic political economy model in which both public research investment and compensation policies are endogenous. Dynamic research effects create credibility problems for government compensation. Once the research investment has been made, the political incentives change for governments that maximise political support. If future compensation is not credible, then opposition to research will not fall and under-investment will result, even if the government has access to non-distortionary policy instruments for compensation. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Johan F. M. Swinnen & Harry de Gorter, 2002. "On government credibility, compensation and under-investment in public research," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 29(4), pages 501-522, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:29:y:2002:i:4:p:501-522
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    Cited by:

    1. Johan F.M.Swinnen & Alessandro Olper & Thijs Vandemoortele, 2011. "The Political Economy of Policy Instrument Choice: Theory and Evidence from Agricultural Policies," LICOS Discussion Papers 27911, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    2. Lazanyi, Janos, 2010. "Agricultural Policy And Rural Development," APSTRACT: Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce, AGRIMBA, vol. 4(1-2), pages 1-8.
    3. Brian Ó Caithnia, 2011. "Compounding Agricultural Poverty: How the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy is Strangling European Recovery," Chapters, in: David Howden (ed.), Institutions in Crisis, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. David Howden (ed.), 2011. "Institutions in Crisis," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14370.

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