Tariff-rate quotas: failed market access instruments?
Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) were one of the policy instruments enshrined in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, intended to improve market access for politically sensitive commodities and sometimes to continue managed trade regimes. This paper examines country and commodity coverage, tariffs bound and applied, administrative methods adopted, quota fill rates and import trends under TRQs. Experience with implementation shows there are problems with underfill and limitations on imports as a result of administrative methods. TRQs have effectively sanctioned import quotas, accompanied by rents and the need to allocate quota rights. Both theory and practice lead to our recommendation for eventual elimination of this instrument through lowering most favoured nation tariffs. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 29 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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