A Semi-Parametric Model for Asymmetric Information in Health Plan Markets
Two sources of asymmetric information in health markets are adverse selection where only individuals know their illness probability and their preventive effort to reduce illness probabilities. This effort is not observed by insurers, and thus individuals cannot be adequately compensated for their effort. I investigate whether asymmetric information plays a role in health care markets through a semi-parametric model that allows both adverse selection and preventive effort. I find that preventive effort plays a role in illness probabilities. If the United States implements universal health coverage, the currently uninsured population will exert less preventive effort, and their illness probabilities will increase. (JEL I11, C14) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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