A Semi-Parametric Model for Asymmetric Information in Health Plan Markets
Two sources of asymmetric information in health markets are adverse selection where only individuals know their illness probability and their preventive effort to reduce illness probabilities. This effort is not observed by insurers, and thus individuals cannot be adequately compensated for their effort. I investigate whether asymmetric information plays a role in health care markets through a semi-parametric model that allows both adverse selection and preventive effort. I find that preventive effort plays a role in illness probabilities. If the United States implements universal health coverage, the currently uninsured population will exert less preventive effort, and their illness probabilities will increase. (JEL I11, C14) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:812-822. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.