Forced Information Disclosure and the Fallacy of Transparency in Markets
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 2004. "Forced information disclosure and the fallacy of transparency in markets," Working Papers 1202, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Rietz, Thomas A. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W. & Smith, Vernon L., 2013.
"Transparency, efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass-through investment trust games,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 257-267.
- Thomas A. Rietz & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields & Vernon L. Smith, 2011. "Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games," Working Papers 11-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Rietz, Thomas & Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy & Smith, Vernon, 2013. "Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games," MPRA Paper 53594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- C. Duke & L. Gangadharan, 2005. "Salinity in Water Markets : An ExperimentalInvestigation of the Sunraysia Salinity Levy, Victoria," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 950, The University of Melbourne.
- Shakun D. Mago & Anya C. Savikhin & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012.
"Facing Your Opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests,"
12-15, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Mago, Shakun & Samak, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests," MPRA Paper 47029, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shakun Mago & Anya Samek & Roman Sheremeta, 2014. "Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests," Artefactual Field Experiments 00416, The Field Experiments Website.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests," MPRA Paper 49888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bart Wilson & Arthur Zillante, 2010. "More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(1), pages 1-16, February.
More about this item
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:699-714. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.