Information Asymmetry and Competitive Bidding in Auditing
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- Zein, Nicole & Simons, Dirk, 2008. "Kosten aus einer asymmetrischen Informationsverteilung zwischen Abschlussprüfer und Mandant," Papers 08-34, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
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