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Delivered Pricing and Merger with Demand Constraints


  • Kristen Monaco
  • John S. Heywood
  • R. Rothschild


The consequences of a demand constraint (low willingness to pay) are examined in a model of merger by spatial price discriminators. The imposition of a demand constraint reduces the extent of inefficiency associated with merger and also eliminates the resolution of the merger paradox obtained in the earlier, unconstrained case. Moreover, with the introduction of a demand constraint, a tax on transport cost can actually improve efficiency, which is never the case in the absence of the demand constraint. Indeed, the optimal tax often eliminates all spatial price competition by creating local monopolies. (JEL D43, L41) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristen Monaco & John S. Heywood & R. Rothschild, 2004. "Delivered Pricing and Merger with Demand Constraints," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(1), pages 49-59, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:42:y:2004:i:1:p:49-59

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Holmes, Paul, 2011. "New evidence of salary discrimination in major league baseball," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 320-331, June.
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    8. Howard Bodenhorn & Carolyn Moehling & Gregory N. Price, 2012. "Short Criminals: Stature and Crime in Early America," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 393-419.
    9. Joshua Pitts & Daniel Yost, 2013. "Racial Position Segregation in Intercollegiate Football: Do Players become more Racially Segregated as they Transition from High School to College?," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 207-230, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2012. "Horizontal market concentration: Theoretical insights from spatial models," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 22-32.
    2. John Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2013. "Sequential entry and merger in spatial price discrimination," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 50(3), pages 841-859, June.
    3. Jen-Te Yao & Fu-Chuan Lai, 2006. "A fiscal regime solving the incentive inconsistency problem," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 40(3), pages 603-619, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices


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