The Role of the Median Legislator in U.S. Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis
In this historical analysis of U.S. trade policy, the authors apply the median voter model to explain legislative decision making. In this model, the level of tariff protection is expected to change with changes in the median legislator. The authors show that this simple model does a remarkable job of explaining trade policy until the mid-1930s, when it breaks down. They offer several possible explanations for the breakdown of this model, focusing particularly on the impact of domestic and international institutional changes that may have altered the role of the median legislator in trade policy formation. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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