IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v34y1996i4p770-80.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does the Per Se Rule Deter Vertical Price-Fixing?

Author

Listed:
  • Butz, David A

Abstract

Manufacturers can easily circumvent legal restrictions on resale price maintenance. They can coordinate and finance their retailers' meet-the-competition price guarantees and guarantee the margins of retailers damaged by price-cutting rivals. Or they can offer various other rewards to outlets that do not discount. Hence, no retailer wants to discount first and, in equilibrium, all charge the 'suggested' resale price. Antitrust enforcers who want to prevent manufacturers from controlling resale prices would need to scrutinize the whole range of transfers between manufacturers and retailers. Unfortunately, doing so could state essential services and penalize innocent firms. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Butz, David A, 1996. "Does the Per Se Rule Deter Vertical Price-Fixing?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 770-780, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:34:y:1996:i:4:p:770-80
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pinar Akman & Morten Hviid, 2005. "A Most-Favoured-Customer Guarantee with a Twist," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2005-08, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    2. Andrei Bazhanov & Yuri Levin & Mikhail Nediak, 2019. "Resale Price Maintenance with Strategic Customers," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 28(3), pages 535-549, March.
    3. Aviv, Yossi & Bazhanov, Andrei & Levin, Yuri & Nediak, Mikhail, 2016. "Quantity Competition under Resale Price Maintenance when Most Favored Customers are Strategic," MPRA Paper 72011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Heywood, John S. & Wang, Shiqiang & Ye, Guangliang, 2018. "Resale price maintenance and spatial price discrimination," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 147-174.
    5. Yong Liu & Michael J. Fry & Amitabh S. Raturi, 2006. "Vertically restrictive pricing in supply chains with price‐dependent demand," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(6), pages 485-501, September.
    6. Haresh Gurnani & Yi Xu, 2006. "Resale price maintenance contracts with retailer sales effort: Effect of flexibility and competition," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(5), pages 448-463, August.
    7. Butz, David A, 1997. "Vertical Price Controls with Uncertain Demand," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 433-459, October.
    8. Jonathan Beck, 2004. "Fixed, Focal, Fair? Book Prices Under Optional Resale Price Maintenance," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    9. Bazhanov, Andrei & Levin, Yuri & Nediak, Mikhail, 2015. "Quantity Competition in the Presence of Strategic Consumers," MPRA Paper 62075, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:34:y:1996:i:4:p:770-80. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.