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Firm Specific Human Capital as an Employer Discipline Device

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  • Laing, Derek

Abstract

The inability of employers to monitor perfectly the level of effort of their employees is a potentially serious impediment to labor market efficacy. Indeed, a number of recent studies have concluded that this may lead to involuntary unemployment, an inefficient sectoral allocation of workers, and discrimination against productively identical workers. This paper shows that the lock-in effect of firm-specific human capital can help alleviate problems of worker moral hazard and thereby promote labor market performance. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Laing, Derek, 1994. "Firm Specific Human Capital as an Employer Discipline Device," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(1), pages 128-137, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:1:p:128-37
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    Cited by:

    1. Mogues, Tewodaj & Carter, Michael R., 2003. "Social Capital and Incentive Compatibility: Modelling the Accumulation and Use of Social Collateral," Staff Paper Series 460, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    2. Tewodaj Mogues & Michael Carter, 2005. "Social capital and the reproduction of economic inequality in polarized societies," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 3(3), pages 193-219, December.
    3. Mogues, Tewodaj & Carter, Michael R., 2003. "Social Capital And Incentive Compatibility: Modelling The Accumulation And Use Of Social Collateral," Staff Papers 12623, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    4. Harvey S. James Jr, 2000. "Separating contract from governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 47-61.
    5. Dorothea Alewell, 1998. "Warum finanzieren Arbeitgeber transferierbare Weiterbildung?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 315-335, April.

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