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Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Banaian, King
  • Luksetich, William A

Abstract

Past research of the effects of campaign spending in Congressional elections has found, contrary to expectations, that incumbent spending lowers votes he or she receives. The authors' model simultaneously determines votes and spending and eliminates this anomaly. A measure comparing the incumbent's voting record to constituent preferences aids model identification. Using two-stage least squares, they find that both incumbent and challenger spending are significant determinants of the popular vote received. Tenure and spending appear to have diminishing returns, and voters appear to punish incumbents who vote against their wishes. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Banaian, King & Luksetich, William A, 1991. "Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 92-100, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:1:p:92-100
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    Cited by:

    1. Epstein, Gil S. & Heizler (Cohen), Odelia, 2018. "Minority Groups and Success in Election Primaries," IZA Discussion Papers 11371, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2005. "Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France. Le cas des élections législatives de 1997," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 56(5), pages 1125-1143.
    3. Epstein, Gil S. & Heizler, Odelia, 2018. "Minority Groups and Success in Election Primaries," GLO Discussion Paper Series 187, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    4. Roger Congleton, 2001. "Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 35-64, April.
    5. Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2005. "Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France," Post-Print hal-00126910, HAL.
    6. Gil Epstein & Raphaël Franck, 2007. "Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 469-489, June.

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