AIDS Testing: An Economic Assessment of Evolving Public Policy
Should laissez faire prevail as to the private-market supply of the AIDS antibody test? Applying a recent theorem from the economics of property rights, this paper determines that the answer is negative, and shows that the optimal policy regarding the AIDS antibody test differs according to whether individuals are at low risk or high risk. Next, using the same economic theory, this paper finds that rules guaranteeing strict confidentiality of the AIDS test results are unjustified. They also are unjustified on traditional legal grounds. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 27 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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