Private contributions to collective concerns: modelling donor behaviour
The obvious discrepancy between the predictions of the standard model of private provision of public goods and empirical indications have led many economists to search for alternative explanations of the phenomenon of voluntary contributions. Whilst concentrating on models of donor motivation, the present paper gives a non-technical survey of a sample of these approaches, and discusses their advantages and limitations. Copyright The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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