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Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?


  • Jeff Strnad


Bayesian empirical approaches appear frequently in fields such as egineering, computer science, political science and medicine, but almost never in law. This article illustrates how such approaches might be very useful in empirical legal studies. In particular, Bayesian approaches enable a much more natural connection between the normative or positive issues that typically motivate such studies and the empirical results. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeff Strnad, 2007. "Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 195-303.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:9:y:2007:i:1:p:195-303

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Opportunistic Termination," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 381-406, August.
    2. Ayres, Ian & Madison, Kristin, 2000. "Threatening inefficient performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 818-828, May.
    3. Guriev Sergei, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-32, August.
    4. Andreas Roider, 2004. "Asset Ownership and Contractibility of Interaction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 787-802, Winter.
    5. Brooks, Richard & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "On and Off Contract Remedies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 290, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-185, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Durlauf, Steven N. & Navarro, Salvador & Rivers, David A., 2016. "Model uncertainty and the effect of shall-issue right-to-carry laws on crime," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 32-67.
    2. Chen, Daniel L., 2016. "This Morning's Breakfast, Last Night's Game: Detecting Extraneous Factors in Judging," IAST Working Papers 16-49, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    3. Chen, Daniel L., 2016. "Mood and the Malleability of Moral Reasoning," TSE Working Papers 16-707, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Feb 2017.

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