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Don't Forget to Protect Abundant Resources


  • Espinola-Arredondo, Ana
  • Munoz-Garcia, Felix


We examine an entry-deterrence model with multiple incumbents who strategically increase their individual appropriation in order to prevent entry. We show that entry deterrence yields a welfare improvement, relative to contexts of unthreatened entry, if firms exploit a relatively scarce resource. When incumbents compete for an abundant commons, however, their exploitation becomes large, and welfare losses can arise. Hence, our paper suggests that policies that protect the commons from further entry are actually more necessary when the resource is abundant than when it is scarce.

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  • Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2013. "Don't Forget to Protect Abundant Resources," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 3(4), pages 251-278, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000032

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Entry Deterrence; Multiple incumbents; Common pool resources;

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities


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