IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/now/jnlpip/113.00000085.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Party and Policy in Lineland: A Theory of Conditional Party Cartels

Author

Listed:
  • John H. Aldrich
  • Gary W. Cox
  • Mathew D. McCubbins
  • David W. Rohde

Abstract

We have two goals in this paper. First, we provide a unified account of several prominent institutional theories of the Congress, but especially present a model that is consistent with both the Cox-McCubbins theory of party cartels (2005; 2007) and the Aldrich-Rohde theory of conditional party government (1997; 2000; Aldrich, 2011; Rohde, 1991). We hope to demonstrate that, while these two theories might have developed independently, together they offer a unified account. Second, we develop a model of elections that includes party provision of campaign resources to provide electoral incentives for Members of Congress to vote on the floor for special rules that reflect positions away from their district median and towards the median of their party in the chamber. In this way we offer a theory that includes specific internal and external accounts to explain a wider array of MC behavior on the floor and in elections.

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Aldrich & Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins & David W. Rohde, 2024. "Party and Policy in Lineland: A Theory of Conditional Party Cartels," Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 479-495, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlpip:113.00000085
    DOI: 10.1561/113.00000085
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/113.00000085
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1561/113.00000085?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:now:jnlpip:113.00000085. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucy Wiseman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nowpublishers.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.