IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/now/jlqjps/100.00022032.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Limited Foresight and Gridlock in Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Parth Parihar

Abstract

status quostatus quopolicy polarizationThis paper contributes to the study of gridlock by analyzing a model of repeated two-party bargaining in which agreements and proposal power are in general both endogenous. I introduce a key object, the foresight horizon, to index the number of downstream agreements agents incorporate into their decision-making on current policy. Gridlock occurs in equilibrium if and only if foresight is limited. I relate equilibrium behavior within the specific setting of legislative bargaining to observed phenomena in public policy-making. While there is short-run correlation of future policy with the , policy converges in the long-run of equilibrium play to an invariant distribution, independent of where it begins. I also demonstrate that — the gap between parties' actionable proposals — is increasing in their foresight.

Suggested Citation

  • Parth Parihar, 2025. "Limited Foresight and Gridlock in Bargaining," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 20(1), pages 71-100, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00022032
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00022032
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00022032
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1561/100.00022032?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00022032. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucy Wiseman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nowpublishers.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.