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The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds

Author

Listed:
  • Moshe Hoffman

    (Harvard University)

  • Christian Hilbe

    (IST Austria)

  • Martin A. Nowak

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

People sometimes make their admirable deeds and accomplishments hard to spot, such as by giving anonymously or avoiding bragging. Such ‘buried’ signals are hard to reconcile with standard models of signalling or indirect reciprocity, which motivate costly pro-social behaviour by reputational gains. To explain these phenomena, we design a simple game theory model, which we call the signal-burying game. This game has the feature that senders can bury their signal by deliberately reducing the probability of the signal being observed. If the signal is observed, however, it is identified as having been buried. We show under which conditions buried signals can be maintained, using static equilibrium concepts and calculations of the evolutionary dynamics. We apply our analysis to shed light on a number of otherwise puzzling social phenomena, including modesty, anonymous donations, subtlety in art and fashion, and overeagerness.

Suggested Citation

  • Moshe Hoffman & Christian Hilbe & Martin A. Nowak, 2018. "The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 2(6), pages 397-404, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nathum:v:2:y:2018:i:6:d:10.1038_s41562-018-0354-z
    DOI: 10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Fang, Xing, 2022. "Why we hide good deeds? The selfless and anonymous donation behavior in crowdfunding," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    2. Dannenberg, Astrid & Weingärtner, Eva, 2023. "The effects of observability and an information nudge on food choice," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    3. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
    4. Joshua Safley & Shan Sun & Jan Rychtář, 2020. "Dishonest Signalling in a Variant of Pygmalion Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 719-731, September.

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