IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nat/natcom/v11y2020i1d10.1038_s41467-020-17730-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolving cooperation in multichannel games

Author

Listed:
  • Kate Donahue

    (Cornell University)

  • Oliver P. Hauser

    (University of Exeter)

  • Martin A. Nowak

    (Harvard University
    Harvard University)

  • Christian Hilbe

    (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology)

Abstract

Humans routinely engage in many distinct interactions in parallel. Team members collaborate on several concurrent projects, and even whole nations interact with each other across a variety of issues, including trade, climate change and security. Yet the existing theory of direct reciprocity studies isolated repeated games. Such models cannot account for strategic attempts to use the vested interests in one game as a leverage to enforce cooperation in another. Here we introduce a general framework of multichannel games. Individuals interact with each other over multiple channels; each channel is a repeated game. Strategic choices in one channel can affect decisions in another. With analytical equilibrium calculations for the donation game and evolutionary simulations for several other games we show that such linkage facilitates cooperation. Our results suggest that previous studies tend to underestimate the human potential for reciprocity. When several interactions occur in parallel, people often learn to coordinate their behavior across games to maximize cooperation in each of them.

Suggested Citation

  • Kate Donahue & Oliver P. Hauser & Martin A. Nowak & Christian Hilbe, 2020. "Evolving cooperation in multichannel games," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 11(1), pages 1-9, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:11:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1038_s41467-020-17730-3
    DOI: 10.1038/s41467-020-17730-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-17730-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1038/s41467-020-17730-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Yu’e & Zhang, Zhipeng & Yang, Guoli & Liu, Haixin & Zhang, Qingfeng, 2022. "Evolution of cooperation driven by diversity on a double-layer square lattice," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    2. Peter S. Park & Martin A. Nowak & Christian Hilbe, 2022. "Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, December.
    3. Cheng, Jiangjiang & Mei, Wenjun & Su, Wei & Chen, Ge, 2023. "Evolutionary games on networks: Phase transition, quasi-equilibrium, and mathematical principles," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 611(C).
    4. He, Jialu & Wang, Jianwei & Yu, Fengyuan & Chen, Wei & Xu, Wenshu, 2022. "The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 418(C).
    5. Li, Wen-Jing & Chen, Zhi & Jin, Ke-Zhong & Wang, Jun & Yuan, Lin & Gu, Changgui & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Perc, Matjaž, 2022. "Options for mobility and network reciprocity to jointly yield robust cooperation in social dilemmas," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 435(C).
    6. Ma, Xiaojian & Quan, Ji & Wang, Xianjia, 2023. "Evolution of cooperation with nonlinear environment feedback in repeated public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 452(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:11:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1038_s41467-020-17730-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nature.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.