Assurance Information: An Experimental Study
In this paper we investigate the market viability of new assurance services being marketed by accountants. Unlike traditional assurance services, such as financial statement audits, these services may be marketed directly to individual consumers, may vary in quality and may take some characteristics of public goods. Our results indicate that some decision-makers will purchase assurance information, but that many will not, even when priced below its risk neutral expected value. Further, our results suggest information users do not fully reflect the information's uncertainty in their purchase decisions, and free riding may occur if information takes some characteristics of a public good.
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