Modelli previdenziali a confronto: analisi stilizzata degli incentivi al pensionamento anticipato
In this work we focus on the analysis of early retirement incentives at the regime phase of the "Dini reform" and of two alternative schemes: the "Amato scheme" and a variant of the "Gronchi proposal". For this purpose we select two parameters: the pension-to-last-wage-ratio (Replacement Ratio) and the "Marginal Cost of Retirement", which captures the distortion of the cost of anticipating retirement by one year brought about by the actuarial unfairness of the pension formula. The analysis shows that the "contribution-related" mechanism is crucial for reducing the wedge between the gross and net wages, although it is not sufficient to eliminate it; it also produces a steeper replacement-ratio curve, making the prosecution of employment more convenient. These results have two policy implications for Italy: the acceleration of the Dini reform transition phase and the development of pension funds, also via the reduction of the contribution payroll tax.
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