IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(201103)1671_149tueots_2.0.tx_2-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Unintended Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Author

Listed:
  • Vidhi Chhaochharia
  • Clemens A. Otto
  • Vikrant Vig

Abstract

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the wake of several scandals that rocked corporate America in 2001 and 2002. The objective behind SOX was to improve corporate governance by improving accounting disclosures. Compliance with Section 404 is considered by many to be the most costly requirement of SOX and has been argued to be a disproportionate burden for small firms. Consequently, firms with a public float below $75 million were granted several exemptions from compliance. We document an unintended effect of these exemptions: a weakening of corporate governance through a weakening of the market for corporate control.

Suggested Citation

  • Vidhi Chhaochharia & Clemens A. Otto & Vikrant Vig, 2011. "The Unintended Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(1), pages 149-164, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201103)167:1_149:tueots_2.0.tx_2-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/the-unintended-effects-of-the-sarbanes-oxley-act-101628093245611794656435
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gregory J. Werden, 2011. "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(1), pages 168-173, March.
    2. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
    3. Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2011. "Business-to-Consumer Transactions 28th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 09-12, 2010, Budapest," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(1), pages 1-3, March.
    4. Vladimir Atanasov & Bernard Black, 2021. "The Trouble with Instruments: The Need for Pretreatment Balance in Shock-Based Instrumental Variable Designs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 1270-1302, February.
    5. Bansal, Shashank & Singh, Harminder, 2023. "Does market competition foster related party transactions? Evidence from emerging market," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201103)167:1_149:tueots_2.0.tx_2-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.