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Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight-Biased Information Updating in Adversary Legal Systems

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  • Robin Christmann

Abstract

The traditional literature on plea bargaining relies on prosecutors who are perfect Bayesian decision-makers, and on courts that can eventually verify the true guilt of the defendant. In this paper, we introduce a limitedly rational prosecutor who is biased in hindsight when evaluating new information. We find that the influence of this behavioral bias on the established equilibria in the literature largely depends on what kind of information causes the bias. Biased evaluation of incriminating evidence may induce higher self-selection at the cost of more wrongful convictions. A biased interpretation of observed deal rejections may eliminate the semiseparating equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Christmann, 2021. "Prosecution and Conviction under Hindsight-Biased Information Updating in Adversary Legal Systems," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(4), pages 404-427.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2021-0017
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2021-0017
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robin Christmann, 2023. "Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 497-532, December.
    2. Christmann, Robin, 2021. "Plea Bargaining and Investigation Effort: Inquisitorial Criminal Procedure as a Three-Player Game," MPRA Paper 108976, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    criminal procedure; plea bargaining; limited rationality; Bayesian;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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