IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mcb/jmoncb/v29y1997i1p106-26.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Seigniorage, Taxation, and Weak Government

Author

Listed:
  • Andrabi, Tahir

Abstract

We examined a setting where decision making about financing a given amount of government spending is decentralized. Seigniorage is the residual tax that passively adjusts to meet the budget constraint. We place this budget making process in a repeated game setting and characterize the cooperative tax-seigniorage function. Three main results are (1) Seignioiage and transitory changes in output are positively correlated. This result holds after controlling for changes in government spending. (2) A positive (negative) covariation between current period government spending and transitory output strengthens (weakens) the positive relationship between seigniorage and transitory output. (3) Seigniorage is negatively correlated with trend output growth. Time series empirical tests using annual data for 20 OECD countries support the first two results. A test using cross-section data on 75 countries confirms the third hypothesis. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrabi, Tahir, 1997. "Seigniorage, Taxation, and Weak Government," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 106-126, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:29:y:1997:i:1:p:106-26
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Svensson, Lars E O & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1989. "Excess Capacity, Monopolistic Competition, and International Transmission of Monetary Disturbances," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 785-805, September.
    2. Huizinga, John, 1987. "An empirical investigation of the long-run behavior of real exchange rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 149-214, January.
    3. Stockman, Alan C, 1980. "A Theory of Exchange Rate Determination," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(4), pages 673-698, August.
    4. Bernanke, Ben S & Blinder, Alan S, 1992. "The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 901-921, September.
    5. Stockman, Alan C., 1988. "Real exchange-rate variability under pegged and floating nominal exchange-rate systems: An equilibrium theory," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 259-294.
    6. Stockman, Alan C. & Stockman, Alan C., 1983. "Real exchange rates under alternative nominal exchange-rate systems," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 147-166, August.
    7. Baxter, Marianne & Stockman, Alan C., 1989. "Business cycles and the exchange-rate regime : Some international evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 377-400, May.
    8. Alan C. Stockman, 1993. "International Transmission under Bretton Woods," NBER Chapters,in: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, pages 317-356 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1982. "Interest rates and currency prices in a two-country world," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 335-359.
    10. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1987. "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 647-666, September.
    11. Cumby, Robert E. & Huizinga, John, 1991. "The predictability of real exchange rate changes in the short and long run," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 17-38, April.
    12. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1984. "A Monetary Equilibrium Model with Transactions Costs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 40-58, February.
    13. Grossman, Sanford & Weiss, Laurence, 1983. "A Transactions-Based Model of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 871-880, December.
    14. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1976. "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1161-1176, December.
    15. Charles Engel, 1991. "Is real exchange rate variability caused by relative price changes? An empirical investigation," Research Working Paper 91-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    16. Mussa, Michael, 1982. "A Model of Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(1), pages 74-104, February.
    17. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1990. "Liquidity and interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 237-264, April.
    18. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
    19. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1986. "Sticky Goods Prices, Flexible Asset Prices, Monopolistic Competition, and Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 385-405.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2001. "When a Monetary Union Fails: A Parable," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 181-195, April.
    2. Hakan Berument, 1997. "Financing divided governments," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(6), pages 369-372.
    3. Crettez, Bertrand & Michel, Philippe & Wigniolle, Bertrand, 2002. "Seigniorage and public good in an OLG model with cash-in-advance constraints," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 333-364, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:29:y:1997:i:1:p:106-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.