Asymmetric Information and Optimal Bank Reserves
One traditional argument in favor of bank reserve requirements holds that since a b ank and its depositors are asymmetrically informed as to the bank's reserve position and its portfolio, the bank will hold too few reserves and too risky a port folio. This being the case, presumably a central banking authority is equipped t o impose and to monitor a minimal reserve requirement yielding a Pareto superior outcome. This paper analyzes this position in the context of a formalmodel and shows that at least for some parameters of the model there is such a case for a minimal reserve requirement. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.
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Volume (Year): 19 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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