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Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados


  • María del Pilar Castillo

    () (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Económicas, Universidad del Valle)

  • Boris Salazar

    () (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Económicas, Universidad del Valle)


Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violence and in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective is achieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. How to build this type of alliances? We propose a formal exercise, represented by a game, where an armed agent and a civilian one update their decisions concerning the relevance of already established alliances. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of alliances are derived from the results of our model.

Suggested Citation

  • María del Pilar Castillo & Boris Salazar, 2007. "Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 67, pages 71-98, Julio-Dic.
  • Handle: RePEc:lde:journl:y:2007:i:67:p:71-98

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    game theory; alliances;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


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