Industrial Policy under International Oligopoly
This paper considers the industrial policy such as product development subsidy in international oligopolistic market. A three-stage game in which the government is the first mover to influence equilibrium outcomes of oligopolistic firms is constructed. It is found that subsidization of the government crucially depends on the slopes of reaction curves in outputs and product development. It is also shown that the government with the multinational firm could bring the asymmetric equilibrium outcomes.
Volume (Year): 35 (1990)
Issue (Month): ()
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