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The Political Economy of Corporatism in Medicine: Self-Regulation or Cartel Management?


  • Zweifel, Peter
  • Eichenberger, Reiner


This paper seeks to explain why delegation of regulatory authority to medical associations (" medical corporatism") is so prominent in health care. It argues that the interests of politicians and physicians in limiting access to medical markets rather than the interests of patients in the control of quality of medical care determines this delegation. Recent trends in physician densities, their impacts on physician incomes, and rates of return to a medical career in several industrialized countries are adduced as evidence to support this claim. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Zweifel, Peter & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1992. "The Political Economy of Corporatism in Medicine: Self-Regulation or Cartel Management?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 89-108, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:89-108

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:pal:compes:v:59:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1057_s41294-017-0027-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Peter Zweifel, 2016. "A Novel way to Compare Health Care Systems and to Assess their Potential Competitiveness," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 155-167, June.
    3. Peter Zweifel, 2001. "On the use of willingness-to-pay studies in health," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 137(I), pages 11-25, March.
    4. Andersson, Fredrik & Skogh, Goran, 2003. "Quality, self-regulation, and competition: the case of insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-280, April.

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