The Political Economy of Corporatism in Medicine: Self-Regulation or Cartel Management?
This paper seeks to explain why delegation of regulatory authority to medical associations (" medical corporatism") is so prominent in health care. It argues that the interests of politicians and physicians in limiting access to medical markets rather than the interests of patients in the control of quality of medical care determines this delegation. Recent trends in physician densities, their impacts on physician incomes, and rates of return to a medical career in several industrialized countries are adduced as evidence to support this claim. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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