Endogenous Change and the Economic Theory of Regulation
This paper extends the economic theory of regulation to include endogenous regulatory change. It outlines conditions under which endogenously rising deadweight costs of regulation can alter the policy equilibrium, even if those rising costs are fully anticipated. Within this framework, alternative wealth redistribution mechanisms can alter the equilibrium path if they bias interest groups' organization costs asymmetrically. The history of natural gas regulation is broadly consistent with this theory. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 3 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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