Opposition Backlash and Platform Convergence in a Spatial Voting Model with Campaign Contributions
This paper investigates the effects of campaign contributions on candidate behavior in elections. The particular focus is on how candidates choose their platforms when they know that the positions they take will influence the level of campaign contributions that they (and their opponents) receive from concerned interest groups. The analysis is carried out in the context of a simple one-dimensional spatial voting model with two candidates and two interest groups. Since the earliest Hotelling-Downs formulations, a central issue in the literature on spatial voting has been the degree to which, under various sets of assumptions, the candidates' platforms converge in equilibrium. This paper extends that literature by examining how the introduction of interest groups making campaign contributions affects the degree of platform convergence. The paper shows that when choosing their platforms, candidates face a trade-off between generating increased support from opponents and provoking a backlash from the opposition. An example is developed to illustrate a surprising result that can occur because of the backlash effect: the introduction of two extremist interest groups may lead the candidates to moderate their platforms, resulting in a greater degree of platform convergence than would be observed in the absence of any campaign contributions. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 98 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:98:y:1999:i:3-4:p:269-86. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.