To Fight or Not to Fight? An Analysis of Submission, Struggle, and the Design of Contests
This paper considers the players' behavior in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate? Analyzing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive. If a self-interested rule-setter chooses the contest-success function endogenously, the authors show that one player will always subjugate. Applications to rent-seeking and environmental regulation are discussed. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 88 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (September)
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