Fiscal Dynamics of Local Elected Officials
The fiscal behavior of local elected officials is examined in a dynamic model where officials maximize an intertemporal objective function in two stages. Officials first decide upon an optimal mix of revenue and expenditure and then minimize loss and adjustment-cost functions. The model is tested using data from the twenty most populated U.S. cities whose mayor was elected on a four-year cycle. The empirical results support the model. Fiscal behavior differs between cities and local fiscal decisions made by elected officials are in part dependent on the timing of elections. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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