Rent-Seeking and Pesticide Legislation
This paper provides a test of the E. Appelbaum and E. Katz (1987) rent-seeking model in which rents are endogenous. The Appelbaum-Katz model is theoretically modified to correspond to the authors' empirical application in which rent-seeking and rent-avoiding coalitions are attempting to influence legislators' votes on pesticide regulations. Probit estimations are used to analyze the legislators' votes on two bills to amend pesticide legislation (a proxy for rent). Empirical results generally support the rent-seeking determinants identified in the model. Tobit estimation is used to investigate campaign contributions by the coalitions to the legislators. These contributions are a proxy for rent-seeking activities. Again, the model is supported. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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