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On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule

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  • Gehrlein, William V
  • Lepelley, Dominique

Abstract

Median Voting Rule (MVR) has been proposed as a voting rule, based on the argument that MVR will be less manipulable than Borda Rule. We find that plurality rule has only a slightly greater probability of manipulability than MVR, and that Copeland Rule has a smaller probability of manipulability than MVR. In addition Borda Rule, plurality rule and Copeland Rule all have both a greater probability of producing a decisive result and a greater strict Condorcet efficiency than MVR. Based on all characteristics, MVR does not seem to be viable replacement for either plurality rule or for Copeland Rule. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Gehrlein, William V & Lepelley, Dominique, 2003. "On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 177-190, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:117:y:2003:i:1-2:p:177-90
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    Cited by:

    1. Bonifacio Llamazares & Teresa Peña, 2015. "Positional Voting Systems Generated by Cumulative Standings Functions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(5), pages 777-801, September.
    2. Mostapha Diss, 2015. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 229(1), pages 347-376, June.
    3. Mostapha Diss & Clinton Gubong Gassi & Issofa Moyouwou, 2023. "Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 489-510, October.
    4. Jean-François Laslier, 2011. "And the loser is... Plurality Voting," Working Papers hal-00609810, HAL.
    5. Vincent Merlin & İpek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "Compromise Rules Revisited," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, February.
    6. Jean-François Laslier, 2012. "On choosing the alternative with the best median evaluation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 269-277, December.
    7. Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver, 2023. "Compromising as an equal loss principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 547-560, September.
    8. Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.

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