Compensating Wage Differentials for Workplace Accidents: Evidence for Union and Nonunion Workers in the UK
This article measures compensating wage differentials for job risks for union and nonunion workers. Job risk is made endogenous to avoid a selectivity bias arising if more able people choose safer jobs. We find that this adjustment has a considerable effect on the union group, raising their fatal risk premium above that of nonunion workers. This implies that there is more variation in unmeasured ability in the unionized group, and that job risk is an inferior good. The fact that unionized workers are also found in safer jobs might therefore be attributable to their greater wealth, rather than to greater "knowledge" in the unionized plant. The estimated statistical value of a life is 8.8 million pounds in 1990 prices for union workers, with nonunion workers about 20 percent lower. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 9 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11166/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:9:y:1994:i:1:p:61-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.