Incentives and Performance in Real Estate Brokerage
This article has two objectives. One is to offer a theoretical model to study how the difference in commission structures affects the performance of agents at full-commission firms (e.g., RE/MAX agents) relative to other agents. The other is to provide an empirical test of the relative performance of full-commission agents. We predict that in equilibrium the selling price and the expected time it takes to sell a listing through a full-commission agent are the same as they are with a traditional agent. Our theoretical predictions are supported by our empirical results. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 22 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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