Redistributive Taxation in the Era of Globalization
This paper analyzes the impact globalization has on voting for redistributive policies in an increasingly integrated world. It explains why tax competition has so far not led to a significant decline in redistributive taxation. The voting process is considered for the two alternatives of direct democracy and representative democracy. In both regimes, globalization pushes down the scope for redistribution, but this effect is mitigated with political representation, since the electorate votes strategically for a slightly more "left-wing" politician with stronger preferences for redistribution. Moreover, voting polarizes twice, with respect to governments' preferences for redistribution and to equilibrium tax rates. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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