The Auction Price of Apartments in Moscow: Hedonic Estimation in Disequilibrium
The purpose of this paper is to see how economic factors determine prices in the previously communist countries undergoing privatization. This does not concern the auctions of big state enterprises where the prices are found to be rigged. In this paper we estimate hedonic price functions based on a unique data set on auction prices of apartments in Moscow. We collected the data ourselves by attending the auctions and gathered data on the characteristics. We estimated the hedonic equations using a disequilibrium approach because no equilibrium prices were observed for large number of apartments that were withdrawn from the auction. We found that, as the privatization of residential housing was carried out, the hedonic price equations fit the data remarkably well. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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