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Percentage Rents and Stand-Alone Property: Share Contracting as a Barrier to Entry

Listed author(s):
  • Yongqiang Chu


    (University of South Carolina)

  • Timothy J. Riddiough


    (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Share (percentage rent) lease contracts have not been explained in the case of stand-alone property. To do so we develop a model of a local trade area with an incumbent retail tenant that makes non-contractable specific investment at the time of initial contracting and a monopolist landlord that controls the timing of follow-on entry. We show that a two-part share contract is optimal, in which a positive fraction of sales revenues is passed from the retail tenant to the landlord. The standard percentage rent contract is, however, dominated by an enhanced contract that includes a lump-sum payment made by the landlord to the incumbent tenant at the time of competitive entry. The welfare-maximizing contract is also analyzed and policy implications are discussed.

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Article provided by American Real Estate Society in its journal journal of Real Estate Research.

Volume (Year): 36 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-40

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Handle: RePEc:jre:issued:v:36:n:1:2014:p:1-40
Contact details of provider: Postal:
American Real Estate Society Clemson University School of Business & Behavioral Science Department of Finance 401 Sirrine Hall Clemson, SC 29634-1323

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Order Information: Postal: Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323
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