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Designing Strategic Games with Preestablished Nash Equilibrium through Artificial Inference and Global Learning

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  • e Oliveira Jr. Hime A.

    (PEE/COPPE/UFRJ and National Cinema Agency, Av. Graça Aranha, 35, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)

Abstract

This work presents novel results obtained by the application of global optimization techniques to the design of finite, normal form games with mixed strategies. To that end, the Fuzzy ASA global optimization method is applied to several design examples of strategic games, demonstrating its effectiveness in obtaining payoff functions whose corresponding games present a previously established Nash equilibrium. In other words, the game designer becomes able to choose a convenient Nash equilibrium for a generic finite state strategic game and the proposed method computes payoff functions that will realize the desired equilibrium, making it possible for the players to reach the favorable conditions represented by the chosen equilibrium. Considering that game theory is a very useful approach for modeling interactions between competing agents and Nash equilibrium represents a powerful solution concept, it is natural to infer that the proposed method may be very useful for strategists in general. In summary, it is a genuine instance of artificial inference of payoff functions after a process of global machine learning, applied to their numerical components.

Suggested Citation

  • e Oliveira Jr. Hime A., 2021. "Designing Strategic Games with Preestablished Nash Equilibrium through Artificial Inference and Global Learning," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 241(4), pages 463-476, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:241:y:2021:i:4:p:463-476:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2020-0040
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    Keywords

    artificial inference; game and mechanism design; global machine learning; Nash equilibria; C60; C71; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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