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Cooperation Via Intimidation: An Emergent System of Mutual Threats can Maintain Social Order

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Can human aggressiveness promote peaceful cooperation? Despite the seeming contradiction of these phenomena, our study suggests the answer is yes. We develop two agent-based models of cooperative interactions among aggressive agents threatening each other. In Model 1, we show that aggressive displays performed by dominance-seeking individuals create a system of mutual threats that effectively enforces cooperation and inhibits agents from escalating conflicts. This happens because agents observe each other fighting, which deters them from attacking each other due to aggressive reputations. In Model 2 we extend this effect to third-party interventions showing that forming alliances makes attacks more efficient and promotes the emergence of common rules determining whom to fight against. In such a state, social order is maintained by the existence of moral alliances – groups of agents willing to fight against norm violators. In summary, we argue that reputation for toughness and the aggressive predisposition of humans could have played an important role in the evolution of cooperation and moral systems.

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  • Piotr Mateusz Patrzyk & Martin TakáÄ, 2017. "Cooperation Via Intimidation: An Emergent System of Mutual Threats can Maintain Social Order," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 20(4), pages 1-5.
  • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2016-99-2
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    1. Stephen Benard, 2015. "The value of vengefulness: Reputational incentives for initiating versus reciprocating aggression," Rationality and Society, , vol. 27(2), pages 129-160, May.
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