Author
Listed:
- Le Wang
(School of Economics and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’An 710049, China; and Key Laboratory of E-commerce and E-government of Shaanxi Province, Xi’An 710049, China)
- Xin (Robert) Luo
(Anderson School of Management, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87106)
- Liangfei Qiu
(Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611)
- Feng Xu
(College of Business, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, Michigan 48126)
- Xueying Cui
(School of Economics and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’An 710049, China)
Abstract
The existing literature has long assumed that unethical behaviors are fueled by competition. Under this premise, rivalry and competition are often treated interchangeably. This study seeks to challenge this prevailing notion by introducing a conceptual distinction between rivalry and competition. Specifically, we explore the multifaceted relationship between rivalry and unethical behaviors in the context of online review self-injecting behaviors. Drawing on the collective regulatory focus framework and deterrence theory, we posit that rivalry-induced deterrence triggers a shift in mindset from promotion focus to prevention focus, which leads to the formation of mutual forbearance in self-injecting behaviors. Mutual forbearance collapses when one party unilaterally engages in self-injection, prompting the other party to retaliate by increasing their self-injecting activities. Additionally, we propose that firm reputation plays a crucial role in reinforcing the formation of mutual forbearance while mitigating its collapse. Employing an exhaustive data set from Ctrip.com and Qunar.com that comprises 85,939 observations from 3,996 hotels and spans 2018–2020, we found that the presence of an additional rival leads to a 3.2% decrease in self-injecting intensity. Furthermore, self-injecting intensity increases by 0.095% for every 1% rise in that of the rivals and increases by 0.041% for a 1% rise in that of the nonrival competitors. Crucially, our study identifies that firm reputation acts as a significant factor that strengthens the negative relationship between the number of rivals and self-injecting intensity and weakens the positive relationship between a hotel’s self-injecting and its rival’s self-injecting intensity. These empirical findings are supported by a myriad of robust examinations, including the use of a set of subsample analyses, alternative measures of independent variables, alternative instrumental variables, alternative observation time windows, and multiple endogeneity tests. This study contributes to the literature by highlighting the pervasive and potent role of rivalry as an understudied inhibitor of self-injecting behaviors. Our empirical evidence offers critical managerial implications for platforms, sellers, and consumers.
Suggested Citation
Le Wang & Xin (Robert) Luo & Liangfei Qiu & Feng Xu & Xueying Cui, 2025.
"Win by Hook or Crook? Self-Injecting Favorable Online Reviews to Fight Adjacent Rivals,"
Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 1333-1353, September.
Handle:
RePEc:inm:orisre:v:36:y:2025:i:3:p:1333-1353
DOI: 10.1287/isre.2023.0179
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