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Creación de empleo e impuestos municipales: un estudio empírico de las externalidades fiscales

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Abstract

This paper studies the effects on job creation of the main local tax rates and of expenditure in some local services. With this purpose we estimate a job growth equation using a panel with more than 100 local governments during 8 years (1992-99). With the aim of bringing evidence about local fiscal externalities, we also include neighbours’ fiscal variables in the equation. The results suggest that tax rates set by the local government have a negative effect on job creation in its jurisdiction, but productive local expenditure and neighbours’ tax rates have a positive effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Solé & Elisabet Viladecans Marsal, 2003. "Creación de empleo e impuestos municipales: un estudio empírico de las externalidades fiscales," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 27(2), pages 393-417, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:27:y:2003:i:2:p:393-417
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    Cited by:

    1. Jordi Jofre Monseny & Alberto Sole Olle, 2007. "Tax Differentials and Agglomeration Economies in Intraregional Firm Location," Working Papers in Economics 180, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    2. Jofre-Monseny, Jordi & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 2012. "Which communities should be afraid of mobility? The effects of agglomeration economies on the sensitivity of employment location to local taxes," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 257-268.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local taxes; job creation; industrial localisation; fiscal competition.;

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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