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Papel de la política de dividendos en las empresas reguladas

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Abstract

In this paper we develop a model to explain the dividend policy of firms under regulation in order to analyse the role of dividends in regulated firms. Before estimating the model using the Generalised Method of Moments, we solved the censoring problem of the dependent variable. The empirical evidence confirms that dividend policy is a mechanism for lessening the conflict between the shareholders and the regulator. Furthermore, this policy is an effective mechanism for aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders in the scenario of regulated firms. In fact, it is more eficient than the ones previously described in the literature, excepting debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Belén Lozano & Alberto de Miguel & Julio Pindado, 2002. "Papel de la política de dividendos en las empresas reguladas," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 26(3), pages 447-474, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:26:y:2002:i:3:p:447-474
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Benito, 2003. "The incidence and persistence of dividend omissions by Spanish firms," Working Papers 0303, Banco de España.
    2. Gloria Cuevas-Rodriguez & Jaime Guerrero-Villegas & Ramón Valle-Cabrera, 2014. "Privatization effects on corporate governance, strategy and compensation systems," Working Papers 14.03, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Business Organization and Marketing (former Department of Business Administration).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; dividend policy; agency conflicts.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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