Papel de la política de dividendos en las empresas reguladas
In this paper we develop a model to explain the dividend policy of firms under regulation in order to analyse the role of dividends in regulated firms. Before estimating the model using the Generalised Method of Moments, we solved the censoring problem of the dependent variable. The empirical evidence confirms that dividend policy is a mechanism for lessening the conflict between the shareholders and the regulator. Furthermore, this policy is an effective mechanism for aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders in the scenario of regulated firms. In fact, it is more eficient than the ones previously described in the literature, excepting debt.
Volume (Year): 26 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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