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Monitoring role of institutional and family block-holders in Canadian corporations

Author

Listed:
  • George F. Tannous
  • Fan Yang
  • Weiwei Jiang

Abstract

This study examines whether the monitoring provided by family block-holders is more or less effective than the monitoring provided by institutional block-holders. The data consist of compensation and performance data of Canadian corporations. We measure the elasticity and the sensitivity of bonus and equity-based compensation to return on assets and market-adjusted return as measures of performance. We interpret high and significant elasticity and sensitivity to be indicators of effective monitoring. We find that Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus compensation is elastic and sensitive to performance in family-controlled firms but not in institution-controlled or widely-held corporations. Equity-based compensation is neither elastic nor sensitive to performance. Overall, the study implies that the monitoring provided by institutional block-holders is ineffective in linking CEO incentive compensation to performance. Thus, shareholders should continue their efforts to improve the mechanisms by which they monitor managers.

Suggested Citation

  • George F. Tannous & Fan Yang & Weiwei Jiang, 2013. "Monitoring role of institutional and family block-holders in Canadian corporations," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 4(3), pages 277-303.
    • Handle: RePEc:ids:ijcgov:v:4:y:2013:i:3:p:277-303
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