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Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfram Elsner

    () (Structural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany)

  • Torsten Heinrich

    () (Structural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany)

  • Henning Schwardt

    () (Structural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany)

  • Claudius Gräbner

    () (Structural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, Germany)

Abstract

Classical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence Ayres. In their writings, direct interdependence, interactions (or transactions) among agents, with all beneficial and with all problematic consequences, took center stage in economic analysis. Why, for instance, do people adhere to a particular new fashion or trend? Because others do, after eminent people, wealthy people, the “leisure class” (T. Veblen), have made it a symbol for status. The new fashion, however, ceases to serve as such a symbol once too many people follow it. The constant effort put into following trends and adopting fashion turns out to be a social dilemma , driven by Veblenian instincts, such as invidious distinction in predatory societies, conspicuous consumption and emulation. [...]

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfram Elsner & Torsten Heinrich & Henning Schwardt & Claudius Gräbner, 2014. "Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(3), pages 1-3, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:5:y:2014:i:3:p:188-190:d:39924
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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