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Share Repurchase Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis of Efficacy, Shareholder Wealth, and Corporate Control Effects

Author

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  • Gerald D. Gay
  • Jayant R. Kale
  • Thomas H. Noe

Abstract

This paper compares the dutch auction and transferable put rights (TPRs) share repurchase mechanisms to the traditional fixed-price tender offer in terms of efficiency, wealth transfers, and corporate control. Using Monte Carlo simulations, it is shown that both alternative mechanisms reduce the deadweight losses from inefficient tendering by ensuring that shareholders with the lowest reservation prices are bought out first. The TPR mechanism is further distinguished because it provides greater wealth gains to nontendering and smaller gains to exiting shareholders. The dutch auction mechanism has an efficiency advantage over the TPR because it can be designed to eliminate the possibility of under-subscription and, furthermore, is also a more effective takeover deterrent.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald D. Gay & Jayant R. Kale & Thomas H. Noe, 1991. "Share Repurchase Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis of Efficacy, Shareholder Wealth, and Corporate Control Effects," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(1), Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:gay91
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis, Henock & White, Hal, 2007. "Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 205-233, July.
    2. Meincke, Sven & Nekat, Kai & Nippel, Peter, 2005. "Aktienrückkauf, Kapitalverwässerung und die Bedeutung von Transferable Put Rights," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 594, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    3. Stephen J. Dempsey & Gene Laber, 1992. "Effects Of Agency And Transaction Costs On Dividend Payout Ratios: Further Evidence Of The Agency-Transaction Cost Hypothesis," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 15(4), pages 317-321, December.
    4. Henock Louis & Amy X. Sun & Hal White, 2010. "Insider Trading after Repurchase Tender Offer Announcements: Timing versus Informed Trading," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 301-322, March.
    5. Oded, Jacob, 2011. "Stock repurchases: How firms choose between a self tender offer and an open-market program," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3174-3187.

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