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The negative effects of lender liability

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  • Benjamin E. Hermalin

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  • Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1991. "The negative effects of lender liability," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue sep20.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfel:y:1991:i:sep20:n:91-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1735-1753, November.
    2. Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Contracting Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6s15h2jc, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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    Keywords

    Bank loans; Lender liability;

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