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Standard minimi di qualit?: un approccio teorico

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  • Grassi Iacopo

Abstract

At least since Akerlof (1970), asymmetric information in the case of experience goods has been a central issue in the economic literature. This paper studies regulation in markets where the quality of the experience good is never completely verifiable by consumers even after purchase. In the proposed model firms can decide the quality of the good: always producing a high quality good creates a positive externality in the market, but it causes an incentive to the firms to deviate and produce low quality goods. The main policy instrument for the government, in order to maximize Social Welfare, is to fix a minimum quality standard, but imposing a too high standard might, in some cases, lower the average quality of the good in the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Grassi Iacopo, 2011. "Standard minimi di qualit?: un approccio teorico," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 0(104), pages 29-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/ste2011-104002
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quality; standard; market regulation; experience goods; market failure; asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other

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