Investment funding: the main problem facing labour-managed firms?
This paper investigates the funding difficulties of producer cooperatives and the potential risks for their financers. It claims that a cooperative requiring members to underwrite bonds will not automatically cease being an LMF (labour-managed firms), nor run the risk of under-investing. The paper also claims that an LMF-type firm will not necessarily tend to make high-risk investments because the link that binds LMF members to their firm is closer than that between shareholders and capitalist firms. Further claims are advanced and discussed to confute the widespread assumption that LMFs have no way out of their funding difficulties.
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Volume (Year): 2010/2 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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